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1. THE ECONOMIC ZONE CONCEPT - KENYA PROPOSAL 
The concept of exclusive economic zone as proposed by 
Kenya was first introduced to the United Nations Committee on Sea 
1 
Bed in August, 1971. Since then, it has been developed, alongside 
with other preferential zone proposals, as a possible formula to meet 
what many of the states consider as the special interests of coastal 
states over the resources of the sea adjacent to their territorial 
2 sea. Kenya later refined the concept and submitted to the Committee 
on Sea Bed with the title of "Draft Articles on Exclusive Economic 
3 
Zone Beyond the Territorial Sea as a compromise between the special 
needs and interests of the coastal states on the one hand, and declared 
international principles for the sharing of the ocean resources by 4 
all states, whether coastal or landlocked on the other hand. In 
order to perform the double function the Draft directs that that the 
coastal states shall, first, enter into regional arrangements for 
purposes of regulation and management of resource use within the gone. 
Secondly, that the coastal states shall, by entering into multilateral 
and bilateral agreements, permit land-locked states to exploit resources 
within the economic zone. 
The analysis in the present paper undertakes to examine the 
implications of the Kenya Draft Articles, particularly with reference 
to the allocation of rights and obligations of the coastal states vis-
a-vis the land-locked states, over the economic resources of the 
economic zone. A further examinations shall be done of the rights and 
obligations of other foreign users of the area for economic and non-
economic purposes. In the final section we shall examine the trends 
in the development of international support for the concept of exclusive 
economic zone which, at the time of this writing, seems to have been 
accepted by an overwhelming majority of the delegations to the Third 
1. U.N. Document A/AC.138/SC.Il/SE.8 of 3 August, 1971, p. 54. 
2. The Concept of Patrimonial Sea defined by the Specialized 
Conference of Caribean Countries at Santo Domingo de Guzman in June, 
1972s is a significant concept in the regard. In actual fact, there is 
no difference between the two. Repeated mention shall be made of this 
concept in the paper. For complete text see International Legal Materials, 
Volume XI, No. 4, July, 1972, pp. 892-3. See also infra note 51. 
3. Originally issued on August 7, 1972 as AC/AC,138/SCIl/L 10. 
Reproduced in .international Legal Materials, Vol. XII, No. 1, January, 
1973? pp. 33-35. 
4. "Declaration of Principals 'Governing the Sea-Bed and the 
Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof. Beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction". United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV) 
of 17 December 1970, paragraphs 1, 5 and 7. Reproduced in International 
Legal Materials., Vol. X, No. 1, January, 1971, p. 9. 
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United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (iJNCLOS III), 
2. DELIMITATION OP THE ZONE 
Article I of the Kenya Draft Articles presumes, as a basic 
fact, that the territoiral sea of the coastal states is limited to 
12 nautic&l miles, from appropriate baselines. Then the article pro-
ceeds to declare that all states have a right to determine the limits 
of their jurisdiction over the seas adjacent to their coasts and 
beyond the territorial sea "in accordance with criteria which take 
their own geographical, geological,economic and national security 
factors". It is within the area so determined that the coastal 
state shall exercise pref3r*ntial interests and is called Economic 
Zone. 
Although the article allows for differential criteria, namely: 
geographical, geological, ecological and national security factors, 
freedom to determine the extent of applicability of the criteria is 
not open to the states. Por instance, a coastal state may consider 
that her economic interests over fisheries should extend to three 
hundred miles while her national security interests extend to one 
hundred miles. Or to take a more topical issue, the coastal state 
v/hich is geologically favoured with a continental shelf v/hich extends 
to six hundred miles may desire that it assumes exclusive juris-
diction over all resources of the entire shelf for economic, ecological, 
biological or geographic reasons. However, these claims are not open 
as Article I may seem to suggest. 
Article VII of the Draft prescribes that "The Economic Zone 
shall not in any case exceed 200 nautical miles, measured from the 
baselines for determining territorial sea." What is missing, however, 
is the reason why all the geographical, geological, biological, 
ecological, economic and national security interests which exceed 
the 200 nautical miles must be forsaken. Or stated differently, 
why is the 200 miles to be the maximum distance for the protection 
of those national interests and not a smaller limitation such as, say, 
5 fifty miles which was earlier claimed by Iceland? 
5. Iceland and the Law of the Sea (Reykjavik: The Government of 
Iceland, 1972), p. 9. 
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The criteria', which the coastal. states choose for delimitation 
of the economic zone must be "reasonable" by certain generalizable 
standards in order that such a proposal can be universally acceptable. 
Yet difficulty exists as to whether other st,ates can easily appreciate 
an individual country's ov/n needs and interests which influence choice 
of a particular criterion for delimitation of the area of exclusive 
interests. To give an example, Iceland based her 1972 decision to 
extend fishery zones on factors similar to those enumerated by Kenya. 
The Icelandic government said, "The coastal state should itself de-
termine the extent of its coastal jurisdiction over fisheries on the 
basis of relevant local considerations. In Iceland these considerations 
would coincide with the continental shelf area, which, e.g., at depth 
of 400 meters would be approximately 50 - 70 miles from the coast. 
She decided on a fifty mile fishery zone. 
The point of note here is that even in the case of Iceland 
where the government has demonstrated that the coastal fisheries' 
products constituted approximately 81.8^ of the nation's export trade 
thus being the conditio sine qua non for national economy the fifty 
miles limit adopted by the February 15, 1972 "Resolution of the 
7 
Althing on Fishery Jurisdiction" proved to be unacceptable to countries 
which traditionally fished in the "adjacent" seas notably, the United 
Kingdom, Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany. As soon as 
Iceland took the decision, Her Majesty's Government moved swiftly to 
register an Application with the International Court Qf Justice 
instituting proceedings against the decision of Reykjavik to exclude 8 all foreign fishermen from the fifty miles Zone. 
6. Fisheries Jurisdiction in Iceland (Reykjavik: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, .'February, 1972) p. 8^ 
7. The Icelandic Althing (Parliament) resolved unanimously that 
effective not later than September 1, 1972, the state would extend 
fisheries jurisdiction to 50 miles. For text of the Resolution, see 
International Legal Materials, Vol. XI, Ho. 3, May, 1972, pp. 643-4. 
8. International Court of Justice: Application Instituting Pz'o-
ceedings (filed in Registry of the Court on 14 April, 1972). "Fishing 
Jurisdiction" (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. 
Iceland). 
Note that in a later judgement on merits the ICJ ruled that in 
view of the previous treaty arrangements between the two countries the 
Iceland legislation was not opposable to Britain. In the opinion of the 
Court Iceland was under obligation to grant preferential treatment, 
based on equity, to the applicant. See judgement delivered on 25 July 
1974 in I.C.J. Reports 1974 especially paras. 67 et. seq. The Court 
did not rule on the legality of the Icelandic measure under general 
international law, an evasion which is strongly criticized by Judge 
Ignacio-Pinto in his dissenting opinion. 
- 4 - IDS/WP 289 
This controversy over the Icelandic fisheries field is parti-
cularly relevant to our study because it is recents it is based on 
fairly obvious economic interests of Iceland and also because the distance 
fifty miles is fairly small considering how wide the ocean area is 
from Iceland and the coasts of the contending parties. 
In the case of the Kenya proposal, the head of the delegation 
to the summer, 1971 session of the U.N. Committee on Sea Bed attempted, 
rather unsatisfactorily, to justify why his delegation chose 200 
miles for delimitation of the area. In an intervention, P.X. Njenga said 
that "it was the view of the Kenya delegation that the greatest breadth 
of the continental shelf, anywhere in the world, at 200 meters, should 
be the limit of national jurisdiction to be applied uniformly for all 
9 
States irrespective of the superjacent waters of the coastal state." 
He added, in the same statement, that in the opinion of his delegation, 
that breadth would give a distance of about 200 nautical miles from 
the baselines for measuring territorial sea. But how does this estimate 
comport with other opinions on the width of continental shelves? Is it 
reasonable to suggest that at 200 meters isobath the greatest breadth 
of the continental shelf is 200 nautical miles? 
K.O. Emery, Senior Scientist and an oceanographer from Woods 
Hole Oceanographic Institution, concurs with the United States 
Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources athat the 
average width at 200 meters depth is only 50 nautical miles.^ 
Emery further reports the Commission's estimate that at the depth 
of 2,j00 meters isobath, which would include up to the base of the 
1 1 
continental slope, the average width is only 100 nautical miles. 
On the latter relationship other scholars have differed rather 
strongly. Edward D„ Brown from University College, London, estimates 
9. U.N. Document A/AC.138/SC.i/SR.8 of 27 July, 1971, p. 38. 
10. K.O. Emery, "A11 Oceanographer' s View of the.Law of the 
Sea" in Lewis M. Alexander (ed.), The Law of the Sea: National 
Policy Recommendations (Kingston: University of Rhode Island. 
Fourth Annual Proceedings of Law of the Sea Institute), March, 
1970, p. 220. 
11. Ibid. 
- 5 - IDS/WP 289 
that the 2,500-meter isobath is closer to 200 nautical miles than 
12 to 100 nautical miles. On this he finds enthusiastic concurrence 
1 3 
in Luke W. Finlay. However, Pinlay seems to applaoud Brown's 
estimate for a completely different reason. Pie recognizes that 
several Latin American countries have presented a fait accompli 
by establishing their claim over 200 miles of the sea and that 
they would not be persuaded to roll back in order to join in any 
international consensus for a lesser distance. That argument, of 
course, does not link the national claim for uniform width of 200 
nautical miles with any rights which a country may claim over the 
continental shelf as a natural prolongation of her continental land 
mass. 
f. 
The Latin American states? Chile, Peru and Ecuador, the 
forerunners in the establishment of the 200 miles tradition, in 
maritime claims, have not attempted to make any such connections, 
simply because they have a negligible width of continental shelf. 
On the other hand, the eastern coast countries of Latin America, 
such as Argentina and Brazil, which have broad shelf area have not 
made that connection either. Argentina has continental shelf which 
extends to Falkland Island, about six hundred miles from her coast; 14 Brazil has continental shelf about 350 miles at its widest point. 
Kenya cannot base the 200 mile Economic Zone on the width 
of her continental shelf, nor on.the shelves of either of her coastal 
neighbours, Somali and Tanzania. Appendix A to this paper shows an 
estimated profile of the continental shelf on the east coast of 
Africa from Cape Guardafui to the mouth of the River Ruvuma, and 
nowhere along that coast does the shelf exceed one hundred kilometers, 
about 63 nautical miles. The average breadth along the Kenya coast 
is less than twenty kilometers — about thirteen miles. 
12. E.D. Brown. "A Comment on the Proposal Legal-Political 
Framework for the Development of Submarine Mineral Resources11 in 
Law of the Sea: National Policy Recommendations, op.cit., p. 44. 
13. Luke W. Finlay, "A Critique" in Lay/ of the Sea: National 
Policy Recommendations, page 52. 
14. I' am indebted to K.O. Emex-y for these estimates. Neither ' 
Argentina nor Brazil has published exactly the width of their 
continental shelves. However, estimates can be made from bathy-
metric maps. One of the best maps available for studies in law 
of the sea is the Boundaries Separate Seabed Area of Sharply Contrasting 
Topographic Gradients, prepared by the Office of the Geographer, 
Department of State, Washington, D.C. Serio No. 512523 11-71. 
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Available evidence does not seem to connect the 200 miles 
isobath to 200 nautical miles as the average or greatest breadth. 
The justification of the choice of 200 miles as the width of 
Economic Zone must therefore be sought elsewhere. Indeed, the 200 
miles figure is a widely adopted measure particularly in latin 
America where no attempt has been made to justify it as a criterion 
for delimitation of coastal jurisdiction. As Luke Finlay pointed 
out in the statement quoted above, most states realize that Latin 
American states will not, accept a roll-back from the. present claims. 
Yet it is inadequate to conclude that all the states therefore should 
bend their arguments to fit the terms of the 200 miles-club. Perhaps 
that is the case, .in fact. 
One of the strongest supporters of limited coastal state 
jurisdiction was Ambassador Arvid Pardo who himself initiated the 
current sea-bed debates at the United Nations in 1967. What is 
striking is the change in Pardo's position to accept and justify 
the 200 nautical miles for coastal states as "national ocean a 
„ 15 space". 
...the majority of coastal States cannot 
extend their jurisdiction beyond 230 to 
270 miles from the coast and that claims 
of coastal State jurisdiction beyond 200 
miles from the coast are rare and usually 
of an indirect nature. Thus the maximum 
limit of coastal state jurisdiction which 
need be suggested is somewhere between 200 
and 270 miles from the coast. Taking into 
account the general interest of the inter-
national community to keep the widest possible 
area of the ocean space open to the non-
discriminatory access of all, and the fact 
that some coastal States have already pro-
claimed that their jurisdiction extends to the 
200 miles from their coasts, my delegation has 
come to the reluctant conclusion that, to avoid 
prolonged debate and haggling, it is necessary 
to establish a distance of 200 miles from the 
nearest coast as the outer limit of the coastal 
State jurisdiction in ocean space. 
15. U.N. Document A/AC.138/53, August, 1971. Articles 36-38 
and 56-61 . Reproduced in the General Assembly Official Records: 
Twenty-Sixth Session. Supp1ement No. 21, (A/8421 ), pp. 105-193. 
16. Quoted in McGill Law Journal (Montreal), Volume 17, No. 4, 
1971, pp. 634-5; emphasis added. 
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Ambassador Pardo's statement underlines the point already-
made above: that'proponents of the 200 mile limit are frankly-
influenced in their choice by the fact that several states have claimed 
jurisdiction to that distance and they envisage no chances that those 
states would roll-back to lesser distance. Further, the point is 
made that the 200 miles limit could be exceeded by a larg-e number of 
coastal states and that because of national interests the states 
would ordinarily opt for greater distances. However, because of the 
.y general interest of the international community which the states have 
supported by the repetitious United Nations resolutions, coastal 
17 
states are shy to exceed the 200 miles limit, ' Thirdly, although 
there is room for coastal states to extend their jurisdiction out to 
270 miles they do not have to claim the maximum feasible distance. 
With respect to certain international interests, coastal states do 
recognize a necessity, if not a duty, to forego the benefit which 
might accrue from the wider areas of national jurisdiction. 
From the foregoing it seems plausible to conclude that pre-
vailing national interests and established claims are responsible 
for the selection of 200 nautical miles for delineation of national 
economic jurisdiction in the ocean space. What Njenga suggested 
as a general alignment of 200 meters isobath and the 200 nautical 
miles from the coast is not supported by scientific opinions 
already surveyed. Moreover, there is no indication that even if the 
200 miles coincided with the 200 meters the states would be inclined 
to accept claims extended by the distance criterion. On this point 
the Icelandic fisheries controversy is illustrative. 
Although the outer limit continental shelf of Iceland at 
1 8 
depth of 400 meters averages 50 to 70 miles from the coast and 
although that country selected to delimit their jurisdiction at 
50 miles that limited distance was not acceptable to Belgium, Great 1 9 Britain and countries. The complaint against Iceland was based on 
17. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 
1970 gives a comprehensive summary of the .principles which the members 
adopted as on sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction. • . A. — • •• 
18. Fisheries Jurisdiction in Iceland, op.cit., pp. 18 and 32. 
19. The I.G.J, issued orders regarding interim measures of 
protection and the question of Court's jurisdiction regarding applications 
of Great Britain and Germany on August 17 and 13, 1972. See International 
Legal Materials, Vol. XI, No. 5, September, 1972. 
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the foreign countries' traditional fishing interests to fish within 
fifty miles of Iceland's coast e-'en though the estimated distance 
between Iceland and the British Isles is over 350 nautical miles. 
The position adopted by Britain and Germany over Iceland's 
action suggest another difficulty for the Kenya scheme. Njenga 
had suggested to the U.N. Committee on Sea Bed that the distance 
to be adopted for Economic Zone "should be unfirom for all countries", 
20 
with adjustments made only in the case of archipelagoes. Now, if 
fifty miles is alreadyin difficulty of acceptance it must be wondered 
in how many cases the proposal for exclusive Economic Zone will be 
easily acceptable. Definitely, the issue regarding the effect of the 
extension of Economic Zone over existing fishery agreements should 
have been covered in the Draft Articles. It will be an issue in 
East African countries, for instance, where the plans for termination 
or phasing out process of the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council shall 
influence efficacy of the new regime. None of the African States is 21 
a party to the Council's 1961 Agreement whose area of operation is 
Indian and Pacific Ocean. 
To give effect to the criteria chosen by coastal states for 
an economic zone the contending national interests must be considered 
and included in the negotiations. Both validity and efficacy of 
legislative decisions by coastal states regarding the Economic Zone 
will depend on acceptance by states which have otherwise enjoyed the 
resources within the "adjacent" sea. 
3. POWERS OP THE COASTAL STATES WITHIN THE ECONOMIC ZONE 
Article II of the Draft Articles provides that the primary 
benefit of the Economic Zone shall be for the primary benefit of the 
people of the coastal state. To ensure that the primary goal so 
provided is met the coastal state "shall exercise sovereign rights 
over the natural resources for the purpose of exploration and ex-
ploitation". (Emphasis added.) Further, the article provides that 
20. U.N. Document A/AC. 138/SC. l/SR.8 of 27 July, 1971, p. 38. 
21. 418 United Nations Treaty Series 1961 (348). 
Members of the IPFC are: France, Philippines, U,S.A., Burma, Ceylon 
(now Sri Lanka), Australia. Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, India, 
Netherlands, China (Taiwan), U.K., Pakistan, Korea, Japan, New 
Zealand and Vietnam. The Original Agreement was concluded in 1948; 
see 120 UNTS 1952 (59). It was revised in 1961. 
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"within the zone they (coastal states) shall have exclusive juris-
diction for the purposes of control, regulation, and exploitation" 
of such resources of the zone and to take measures to prevent and 
control pollution. 
The subjects of the rights conferred on the coastal states 
are only natural resources: living and non-living. Exceptions which 
could be obtained from the Economic Zone must be very few, the notable 
examples are, perhaps, sunken ships or such objects when recovered. 
What may be subject to dispute are archeological artifacts whose 
origins are doubtful considering that ocean currents are capable of 
transporting such objects from long distances over an extended 
period. 
What is even more important in the Kenya scheme is the fact 
that the coastal states shall enjoy sovereign rights and exclusive 
jurisdiction over all the natural resources of the economic zone. 
In juridical terms, exlcusive jurisdiction refers to such 
jurisdiction as is exercised only by the party upon whom it is 
conferred. That is, they are powers the exercise of which are not 
shared with any other state. Such competence exercised for the 
purpose of control, regulation and exploitation of the natural resources 
of the Zone and for conservation and pollution control as provided 
22 
by Article II is simple and conclusive. Just to draw an analogy 
from the opinion of the International Court of Justice in the North 
Sea Continental Shelf Cases, where the rights are "exclusive" the 
coastal state may choose whether or not it shall explore or exploit 
the resources appertaining to it and "that is its own affair, but 23 no one else may do so without its express consent". 
22. See similar emphasis by the Court in the Fisheries Case, 
I.C.J. Reports (1951), P. 132. Ecuador, whose 200 miles claim has 
not been recognized by the United States, has repeately arrested 
and held U.S. fishing vessels. That is the best known of enforce-
ment cases of unilateral extension of.coastal jurisdiction, now a 
matter of public record. 
23. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases "Judgement", I.C.J.Reports, 
1969, p. 22. 
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No problem is present in international law if the coastal 
state does not choose to explore and/or exploit the resources within 
her jurisdiction. However, where the exercise of the coastal state 
powers involves limitation on other states, for instance, in order 
to prevent and control pollution, serious controversies can be 
averted only if the standards applied are internationally accepted. 
Or where such limitations involve actual exploitation of resources, 
the'conflicts may resemble the Icelandic fisheries issue discussed 
above. 
There are subjects of potential interaction in maritime 
activities which may lead to serious conflicts. For example, 
aquaculture versus dredging; general waste disposal versus biological 
conservation; dredging versus shell-fishing; dredging versus drilling 
24 which may be classified as mutually exclusive. 
Where the interactions are perceived to be strong, or very 
bad, or mutually exclusive, the Kenya Draft Articles empower the 
coastal state to legislate in order to control and prevent adverse 
results within the 200 miles of Economic Zone. This is similar to 
what the Canadian Government decided when in 1970 she declared an 
"anti-pollution" zone up to 100 nautical miles from her Arctic 
coast, imposed penalties and civil liabilities for violations and 
authorized comprehensive regulation and inspection of vessels to 
25 prevent pollution. 
The United States reacted publicly and sharply, criticing 
Canada for acting unilaterally instead of pursuing change by inter-
national agreement. Was it the fact that the action of Canada 
was unilateral that infuriated her neighbour or was it the substantive 
action which the United States considered a real threat to her in-
terests in the Arctic Ocean area? Most probably, both hypotheses 
contributed toward the United States' attitude; nevertheless, the 
Canadian authorities argued that they saw no prospect for satisfactory 
24. See for illustrations, "Uses of the Sea". A Study Prepared 
by the U.N. Secretary-General, U.K.. Doc. E/5120 dated 28 April, 
1972, p. 35. 
25. Text of the legislation is reprinted in International Legal 
Material s, Vol, IX, 1970, p. 543. See also comment by Lous Herikin, 
"Artie Anti-Pollution: Does Canada Make — or Break — International 
Law" in the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 65, No. 1, 
January 1971, pp. 131-136, 
26. See American Journal of International Lav/, op.oit. , p. 1315 
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27 
agreement through an international machinery, and so decided on 
the unilateral action. 
Indeed, the chances are that the Unites States would most 
probably have been adverse to the Canadian idea if the subject had 
been brought before an international forum. And that is the pro-
blem which the .Kenya proposal faces at the forthcoming international 
negotiations. Historically, the United States has based objection 
to forms of control beyond limited territorial sea on the theorem 
of "creeping jurisdiction", developed by the U.S. Department .of 
28 
Defence. The theory maintains that a claim for functional control 
of ocean space beyond national jurisdiction leads to successive 
greater national claims in those area. The example often cited to 
support' the contention is Peru which successivlly established com-
petence: "200 miles fishing conservation zone (1947), a 200 mile 
petroleum concession area (1 952), a 200 mile area""of exclusive 
sovereignty (1952)s a 200 mile coastal air space zone (1965), and 
finally a 200 mile area of 'Dominio' (1969)."29 
The significant point in the United States' position on this 
matter was- made by Leigh Ratiner, then Chairman of Defence Advisory 
Group on Law of the Sea (U.S. Department of Defence) when he expressed 
preference for who; should control the oceans: 
With respect to the question of what'might be 
termed creeping jurisdiction.from international 
authority into the waters and possible air space 
involved, I think that -underlying our thinking 
in the Department of Defence is a fundamental 
. policy decision — we would prefer to trust the 
the international community as a.collective, than 
the coastal States acting individually. There are 
risks that the international community will attempt 
to control the oceans for all purposes, and; the 
air space above. We think these risks are less than 
the risks, of•coastal State control over the 
as time goes by.^^ 
27. Ibid. 
28. See Robert B. Krueger, "An Evaluation of United States 
Ocean Policy" in McGill Law Journal, Volume 17, No. 4, 1971, p. 652. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Lewis M. Alexander (ed.) The United Nations and Ocean 
Management. Proceedings of the Fifth.Annual Conference of the Law of 
the Sea Institute, June 15-19, 1970. (Kingston: University of Rhode 
Island, January, 1971), p.. 331. Mr. Ratiner has since moved to the 
U.S. Department of Interior where he is still deeply involved with 
establishment of the United States position. 
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This statement is the basis of the U.S. objection to off-
shore controls by coastal States, such as t^e Canadian action, and 
is likely to be a source of the United States' objection to the 
powers which the Draft Articles confer on the coastal States over 
the Economic ^one. The point is that the provision for exclusive 
jurisdiction for purposes of control and regulation of resources 
use, and the conservation measures, shall almost inevitably 
interfere with the activities of certain maritime powers and they 
prefer not to leave the exercise of such powers to the coastal 
states. 
As may be evident from illustrations mentioned above 
the exercise of the powers under Article II cannot be accomplished 
"without prejudice to the exercise of freedom of navigation, and freedom 
to lay submarine cables and pipelines" as provided by Article III. 
The present laissez-faire regime of the seas permits any state to 
exercise almost unlimited freedom in these activities,beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction. And that is the state of the 
existing international law: there is no accepted limit of national 
jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea and the contiguous some extend-
31 
ing outward to 12 miles. The establishment of the Economic Zone 
to 200 miles, far beyond territorial sea with the powers conferred on 
coastal states by the Draft Articles, will, in practice, entail abridge-
ment of these freedoms. To include the terms of Article II alongside 
with Article III in the instrument is an obvious attempt to compromise 
disparate and contradictory interests. 
The second aspect of the powers conferred on coastal states 
over the Zone is that of exercise of sovereign rights over the natural 
resources. These rights are perfectly consistent with those regarding 
exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of control just discussed. In 
fact, the two aspects of the powers are complementary. The near-
absolute notion in exclusive jurisdiction is necessary for the protection 
and preservation of the resources over which a state has sovereign 
rights. 
Valid as the foregoing statements might be they still beg 
the question until we fully analyze what the exercise of sovereignty 
over natural resources, as provided in the Draft Articles, implies. 
31. Art. 24 ( 2 ) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial 
b.nd the Cortiguous Zone. 516 UMTS 205 (1964-). 
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On this, the standard international document is the United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
32 
Resources adopted on December 14, 1962. In substance, the resolution 
affirmed the principle of national ownership of natural resources 
within an individual territory and the rights of all states to freely 
dispose of their natural resources and wealth. That is as much as 
right as any sovereign state can have within the national jurisdiction. 
But is this any different from the sovereign rights which a coastal 
state can exercise by virtue of the provisions of the Kenya Draft 
Articles, within the Exonomic Zone? Kenya makes it clear that the 
coastal state shall exercise both sovereign rights over the resources 
and exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of exploration and exploitation 
thereof. No other meaning is provided in the draft and no clue that 
the meaning deviates from that provided in the United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty. 
A new and more direct resolution was adopted by the United 
33 
Nations General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session. This new 
resolution, which recalled the 1962 affirmations, among others, 
"reaffirmed" under paragraph (l) "the rights of states to permanent 
sovereignty over all their natural resources, on land within their 
international boundaries, as well as those found in the sea-bed and 
the subsoil thereof within their national jurisdiction and in the 
superjacent waters". In the scheme of our study the Zone proposed by 
Kenya is placed by the Draft Articles under national jurisdiction 
within the meaning of the General Assembly Resolution just quoted. 
This amounts to actual assimilation of the Zone into the territorial 
body of the claiming state, at least for purposes of the natural re-
sources and the accompanying provision for regulation and management. 
One might even argue that the land-locked states do not have any more 
right to the resources of the Zone than any state has to the land-
based resources of any other state, coastal or land-locked. This 
point must be borne in mind as the next section focuses on the rights 
of other states to resources of the Zone. 
32. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) in U.N. 
G.A.O.R. Supplement No. 17 (A/521) Seventeenth Session, pp. 15-16. 
33. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3016 (XXVII) "Permanent 
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources of Developing Countries" adopted 
on December 18, 1972 (by votes 102 in favor, none against and 22 
abstaining), Reproduced in International Legal Materials, January, 
1973, pp. 226-7. 
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4. RIG-HITS AND OBLIGATIONS OP THIRD STATES WITHIN THE ZONE 
There are four categories of third party interests that may 
be considered in the question of access to the resources of the 
Economic Zone. Pirst are the adjacent coastal states which may, 
by virtue of proximity, claim some of the resources the distribution 
of which spreads across territorial boundaries. The point will be 
particularly pertinent over migratory coastal fishery resources, 
which may require joint management and control for purposes of exploita-
tion. Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania, for instance, could adopt regional 
arrangements for fishing of coastal species and thus avoid the con-
flicts which resulted in arrest of Kenya fishermen in the Pemba Channel. 
34 
in 1970. Regarding fisheries in that area, therefore,the boundary 
in the Channel would have had only incidental significance. To a 
lesser extent, there may be cases of mineral resources such as 
hydrocarbons contained in veins which cross national boundaries 
in the sea-bed or continental shelf. Without agreements for joint 
management in such areas potentials for conflict are real. In the 
Red Sea, for instance the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia issued a Decree to 
the effect that she "owns all the hydrocarbon materials and minerals-
existing in the strata of the sea—bed ajacent'1 to that countrjr's 35 continental shelf. But the Red Sea mineral resources also now 
include the recently discovered and valuable hot brines settled 
36 in the Central Rift. 
Strictly speaking, the issue would not be one of rights, 
per se, if such coastal states, by agreement, design a pattern for 
joint exploitation of the resources. The issue will be one of joint 
management and sharing of the resources and an exercise of sovereign 
rights over "shared" resources rather than alienation of the sovereinty. 
As a matter of fact, the idea of regional arrangements which the 
Draft Articles allude to in Articles VI and VII could be deployed in 
order to facilitate establishment, of standards for conservation and 
utilization of such resources. 
34. (East African Standard - September 19, 23 and 24; October 
5 and 6, 1970.) 
35. Royal Decree Number M-2.7 dated September 7, 1388 Hegria 
reprinted in International Legal Materials, Volume, No. 3, May, 1969, 
p. 606. Section 3 provides for sharing with neighbouring governments 
which have rights recognized by the government of the Saudi Arabia 
Kingdom. Almost the whole of the Red Sea is underlain with Continental 
Shelf. 
36. Por a recent report on the deposits see David A. Ross, "Red Sea 
Hot Brines Areas: Revisited". Science, Vol 175, pp. 1455-1457 of March 
31, 1972. Dr. Ross has told this writer that he has done one study of 
the sediments at the request of Saudi Arabia. In which case, Sudan and 
Eritrea on the opposite shore would have to convice Saudi a Arabia of 
the legitimacy of their claims. 
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The second category of third state interests are those of 
foreign enterprises which desire participation in exploitation and 
exploration of,the resources of the Zone. Examples in this 
category are the Deep Sea Ventures from the Unites States, the state-
owned fishing enterprises from the Soviet Union or Japanese long-
distance fishermen. Article V provides that they "may obtain permission 
from the coastal state to exploit the resources of the Zone" and only on 
such "terms as may be laid down and in conformity with laws and regu-
lations of the coastal state." Ultimately, this scheme confers no 
more rights on a foreign state or person to utilize resources of 
the Zone than current provisions of international law confers on a 
private enterpriser investing on land-rbased operations in a foreign 
37 country. 
It is perhaps no mere coincidence that at the time of the 
development of the proposals on extended preferential zones for 
coastal states the United Nations General Assembly should have adopted 
38 
the Reolution 3016 (XXVIl) referred to above. Both efforts point 
to a compact assimilation of the resources of the Economic Zone 
and to have no difference in international law as to the powers a 
coastal state has to dispose of the natural resources for the 
primary benefit of her own citizens as provided by the General 
Assembly resolution, 1803 ( x v i l ) . Accordingly, we find that there 
are no unique rights possessed by this category of parties, either 
directly or indirectly, to the resources of the Zone. 
The third category of third states are the land-locked countries 
within the African Continent. What rights would they possibly have to 
37. In the introductory summary to the "Report of the Secretary 
General oh Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources" it is'stated 
that the exercise encompasses "not only the formal rights of possession 
of those resources and freedom to decide on the manner in which they 
shall be exploited and marketed, but also the capability to exploit 
and market .them so that the people of the state concerned may benefit 
effectively from them". See the Exercise of Permanent Sovereignty 
Over Natural ReSQ.urces and the Use of Foreign Capital and Technology 
for Their.Exploitation. (A/18058 of 14 September 1970), p. 7. 
38. Ibid. See also paragraph ( 3 ) of Resolution 3016 (XXVIl) 
which "Declares that actions, measures, or legislative .regulations by 
States aimed at coercing, directly or indirectly, other States engaged 
in the change of their internal structure or in the exercise of 
sovereign rights over their natural resources, both on land and in 
their coastal waters, are in violation of the Charter and of the 
Declaration" of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations among States contained in Resolution 2625 (XXV) (emphasis 
added). 
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resources of a Zone within which coastal states exercise sovereign 
rights and exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of control of ex-
ploitation and exploration of the resources? Underlying this 
question is the assumption based on the principles, declared by 
the majority of states, that resources beyond limits of national 
jurisdiction should be utilized with particular consideration for 
39 
the interests of developing countries whether coastal or land-locked. 
Accordingly, it was considered that in case of negotiation for 
extension of competence of coastal states a special formula needed 
to be sought to relieve the land-locked, states of the disadvantage 
imposed on them by geography. 
The Kenya delegate who introduced the subject of Economic 
zone explained to the United Nations Committee on Sea-Bed that 
39. See U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2467 (XXIIl) of 21 
December 1968, 2750 (XXV) of 17 December 1970, and 2749 (XXV) of 
17 December 1970. The assumptions at the time of adoption of 
these resolutions did not include the extended preferential zones 
such as 200 miles proposed by Kenya. Accordingly, by the so-called 
"Moratorium Resolution", UNGA Resolution 2574 (D) of December 15, 
1969, the General Assembly resolved that 
"(a) States and persons, physical or juridical are 
bound to refrain from all activities of exploitation 
of the resources of the area of the sea-bed and ocean 
floor and the sub-soil thereof beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction. 
(b) No claim to any part of the area or its resources 
shall be recognized" 
— until an international regime is established by international 
agreement to regulate and administer use of the area for the 
benefit of all mankind. Resolutiin is reprinted in International 
Legal:''Materials, Vol. IX, No. 1, January 1970, p. 422. The general 
inclination was still in favour of a limited Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone a la 1958 Conventions where 12 nautical miles was 
the limit. The rest of the area was to be res communis ominum. 
On these discussions see Josef L. Eunz, "Continental Shelf and 
International Law; Confusion and Abuse" in American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 4, July, 1955, p. 829; and D.A. Kamat, 
"Recent Developments in the Law Relating to the Sea Bed", Indian 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1972, pp. 9-19"* 
and Wolfgang Priedmann, "Selden Redivivus— Towards a Partition 
of the Seas?" in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 65, 
No. 5, October, 1971, pp. 757-770. 
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The solution of the.land-locked countries' 
problem must be found within a regional 
framework,; and his delegation was prepared 
to negotiate with other African delegations, 
to work out an acceptable formula.40 
Admittedly, the question of sharing of the resources would 
be answered by resort to regional arrangements. Indeed, as Article 
VI of the Draft Articles provides, rights for land-locked, near 
land-locked or shelf-locked countries "shall be embodied in multilateral 
or regional or bilateral agreements." But what are the rights of 
third states to resources over which the coastal state exercises 
sovereign rights? The bilateral or regional agreements are to be 
concluded under terms provided by these Draft Articles. And the 
Articles, as we have seen, confer on the coastal state exclusive 
jurisdiction for purposes of control and exploitation of the 
resources. In which case what the land-locked countries may have 
are only privileges and not rights. 
Article VI specifies the conditions under which the. .coastal 
state can permit a land-locked state to exploit resources of the 
Zone. Por instance, the coastal state must, be satisfied that the 
resources to be used by the land-locked state are "effectively 
controlled by their national capital and personnel." First of all, 
this could not be ascertained, even if that were possible, without 
acceptance of a subordinate status of the applying state. Secondly, 
the idea of "effective control" may be difficult to ascertain parti-
cularly in a field as technologically complex as exploitation of 
41 
marine resources. In final analysis, therefore,, the industrialized 
countries from any part of the world may have a better chance of 
access to resources of the Zone than land-locked states within the 
continent. The scheme of Economic Zone does not require that any 
part of the proceeds from the Zone be transferred to an international 
treasury which would ensure that the land-locked states benefit too. 
40. Recorded intervention by Njenga of Kenya in U.N. Document 
A/AC.138/SC.i/SR.8 of 27 July 1971, p. 38. 
41. See Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources; note 33y 
page 8, v/here it is correctly recognized that technical knowhow 
for exploitation of petroleum and mineral resources has been 
developed primarily in industrialized countries. On technological 
limitations regarding fisheries, see Gulkian, W. J. and van den 
Hazel, N.W., Reconnaissance Survey and Fishery Harbours and Landing 
Places. (Rome.? Food and Agricultural Organization of the U.N. and 
the United Nations Development Program, March, 1971), pp. 7-8. 
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The industrialized countries which may participate in exploitation 
of the area would pay fees to the coastal state. 
There is nothing in these discussions to requires us to take 
seriously the statement reported1to have been made by Njenga, on 
behalf of the Kenya delegation, to the U.K. Committee on Sea-Bed 
that "His country was prepared to give nationals of the 14 land-
locked countries of Africa, within regional or bilateral agreements, 
the same treatment that it gave to its own nationals within the 
49 
limits of its national jurisdiction."'" This is not consistent 
with the facts regarding the exorcise of national sovereignty over 
natural resources and exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal state 
as already analyzed. 
Perhaps in an attempt to modify that 1971 position of the 
Kenya delegates Article VI of the Draft Statute I'efers only "to 
43 
the neighbouring developing land-locked, near land-locked and 
countries with small shelf" v/hich would be permitted to invest in 
the enterprises within the zone. But just what constitutes a neigh-
bouring state? Is Zaire, a near ' land-locked state, whose area 
occupies the entire central Africa, considered neighbour to the 
countries on the eastern coast of Africa or on the West coast? 
What about the victims of political warfare in southern Africa such 
as Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, all cut off from the sea by South 
Africa: whose neighbour are they? The Draft Articles' give no clue 
as to what the limitation of "neighbourhood" shall be and this leaves 
moot the question of whether Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland would 
be left at the mercy of South Africa or if the more fortunate 
northern states shall consider them neighbours for purposes of a 
resource sharing in the Zone. 
42. U.N. Document A/AC.138/SC.l/SR.8 dated 27 July, 1971, p. 38. 
43. By near land-locked states is meant countries with almost 
no notable coastline at all, e.g. Zaire, a massive country, but with 
only 22 nautical miles of coastline. I am indebted to Pemmaraju 
Sreenivasa Rao of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution for this 
point, which, he tells me, he learned during the African States 
Regional Seminar on Law of the Sea at Yaounde in June, 1972. While 
land-locked states are defined as "non-coastal", "continental" or 
"inland" as opposed to coastal, the "shelf-locked" states are coastal 
but whose legal continental shelf is cut-off from the sea-bed beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction by the continental shelf of one 
or more other states. For a detailed discussion on these disihctions, 
see Vladimir Ibler, "The Interests of Shelf-Locked States and the 
Proposed Development of the Law of the Sea, "Indian Journal of Inter-.. 
national Law, Vol. II, 1971,. p. 389. 
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Moreover, Article XI merely provides that "(n)o territory 
under foreign domination and control shall be entitled to establish 
an Economic Zone" but it does not provide for how the neighbouring, 
land-locked, near land-locked or shelf-locked states shall have 
access to the resources within the 200 miles of the coasts of those 
foreign dominated territories. Por instance, how could Zaire to exploit 
44 the resources off the coast of the Portuguese dominated Angola? 
The fourth, and final, category of parties which might be 
interested in resources of the Economic Zone are state parties to 
a convention on the off-shore resources before the extension of the 
proposed jurisdiction. In the Indian Ocean, for example, there is 
the still-in-force Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council to which none of the 
45 
eastern African states is a party. The Draft Articles make no 
mention of this sticky issue, nor does it address itself to the issue 
of states which claim "historic" or "traditional" rights over the 
resources of the area to be covered by the Zone. Generally, it is 
understood that the new states reject the notion of historic or tradi-
tional rights because the implications are redolent of cononial 
domination. 
Nevertheless, in order to dispel the validity of an agreement 
still in force in favour of an up-to-date convention because of a 
radical change in circumstances it is desirable that the conditions 
be unequivocally stated. Otherwise the members of the Indo-Pacific 
Fishery Council, such as Japan and China (Taiwan), may simply choose 
to ignore the new proposal and consequently jeopardize the efficacy 
of the new regime by continued fishing operations off the coasts and 
within the Zone. 
44. Countries like Angola, Mozambique and the Seychelles were easily 
distinguishable as foreign dominated. In the cases like Christmas 
Island, just south of Indonesia's Java but "possessed" bj^  Australia 
the distinction becomes more difficult. But on African continent the 
definition gets into muddy waters of politics if South Africa is 
recognized as non-foreign dominated because that implies legitimacy 
to the authority of the Smith Regime in Rhodesia. South African Case 
of intex-nalized colonialism . deserves an attack as a colonial regime 
in its own right. 
45. See note 21 above. 
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One approach for handling the operations of such long dis-
tance fishermen .is, I suggest, by allowing a gradual phasing out of 
the activities so that, say, after two years they cease to fish 
within the Zone completely. This approach can be followed with or 
without special fees paid to the coastal state as may be agreed upon. 
By the second approach, instead of expelling the foreign 
fishermen, special fishing agreements can be entered into such as 
Kenya and Tanzania have done with Japan for joint enterprises. By 
now, Kenya is aware of her profits from Kenya Pishing Industries, 
ltd., composed of two Japanese firms: Ataka and Co., ltd. and Taiyo 
Pishing Company, Ltd., together with the Kenya Maritime Company, 
46 
and the State agency, I.C.D.C. By this method the foreign fishermen 
remain in operation but as foreign investors under ordinary controls 
and with the security of tenure in accordance with international law 
and municipal lav/ of the coastal state. 
In certain cases foreign interests may be directed to stop 
operations within the Zone and withdraw vessels as soon as the 
extension is decided upon, either unilaterally or by international 
agreement. An analogous action was taken by South Africa in 1963 
when the government proclaimed its authority to control fishing 
47 
within 12 miles off her coast and the coast of South West Africa. 
South Africa did not recognize any traditional fishing privileges on 
the grounds that all the foreign participation was only of recent 
occurrence, i.e., since 1960-1961, and as such insufficient to 
constitute a claim of established tradition. 
Regarding the Indian Ocean, Hayasi has reported that Japanese 
A 8 longline fleets started operations about 1952 while the Koreans and 
46. East African Standard, June 27, 1970, p. 5. 
47. See David W. Windley, "International Practice Regarding 
Traditional Pishing Privileges of Foreign Fishermen in Zones of 
Extended Maritime Jurisdiction" in American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 63> Mo. 3, July, 1969, p. 502. 
48. S. Hayasi. Stock Assessment (Rome: The Pood and Agricultural 
Organization and the United Nations Development Programme, March, 
1971), p. 2. 
\ 
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49 
Taiwanese fleets started exploitation of tuna in 1964. In such 
cases the determination of what constitutes adequate historical claim 
may be a hard subject of policy decision and/or negotiation. Further-
more, records would have to be sought for exactly when the fishing 
activities commenced off the coast of the state wheich decides to 
terminate the participation of the long distance .'fishermen. The 
Soviet Union,, a leading Indian Ocean fishing country, is not a member 
of the IPPC and so her case may not necessarily be determined from 
1948, as the base year or the year when the Agreement first came into 
force. 
The facts presented in the Draft Articles and those revealed 
by analysis in this paper reveal that sovereign rights over natural 
resources and exercise of jurisdiction accorded to coastal states 
mean absolute protecton of .national interests within the Zone. 
Other states have no more rights than whatever they may be allowed 
by the coastal state. 
Where third States or their nationals are permitted to 
carry out activities within the Zone they are under certain obligations. 
The. second paragraph of Article II provides that "third states or their 
nations shall bear responsibility for damage resulting from activities 
within the Zone". The requirements are that they desist from creating 
damages such as causing pollution of the ocean environment. Or else 
reparations shall be required accordingly. The coastal state is 
empowered by Article V to "establish spwqjjxl regulations" by which ' 
50 liability for damages can be determined. 
5. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT POR THE CONCEPT OP ECONOMIC ZONE 
Since its introduction into the negotiations the concept of 
Exclusive Economic zone has continued to gain wider interntional 
support as will be clear from the trends traced below. 
49. Ibid..? p.. 7. 
50. The article refers only to damages resulting from activities 
within the Zone. Serious damages can be caused by activities outside 
the Zone and this is possible in cases of oil pollution. Several 
international agreements deal with these subjects, notably the 
"International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage" done at Brussels on November 29, 1969s reprinted in Inter-
national Legal Materials, Vol. IX, No. 1, January, 1970, pp. 45-67. 
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The first major booster was the Declaration of Santo Domingo 
to which reference has been made above. The concept of Patimonial 
Sea which was enunciated by the ten Caribbean States and Mexico at 
the Santo Domingo supported principles similar to those of the Economic 
51 
Zone, In fact, since that meeting the concept of Patimonial Sea 
virtually disappeared from the general lexicon 'of UNCLOS III with 
its supporters rallying behind the "Economic Zone". 
The concept had so much appeal for some of the delegates that 
Christopher Pinto, a senior delegate from Sri Lanka advocated it for 
52 the "Group of 77". The representative of the People's Republic 
of China gave the 200 miles economic zone unequivocal support as 
53 soon as they joined the United Nations, and later their delgation 
to the U.N. Committee on Sea Bed submitted a proposal on exclusive 
54 Economic zone similar to the Kenya version. The United States 
delegation submitted a proposal for an economic zone but without 
55 specifying the numerical delimitation. But Argentina's proposal 
51. The concept of patimonial Sea had originally been introduced 
to the U.N. Committee on Sea Bed by the delegate of Venezuela in 
Sxommer 1971. See U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SR. 164 p. 3. It was adopted 
as a part of the Declaration by the Specialized Conference of Caribbean 
Countries and Mexico at Santo Domingo de Guzman on June 7, 1972 and 
submitted to the U.N. Committee on Sea Bed as U.N. Doc.A/AC.138/90, 
reprinted in U.N. Official Records, United Nations General Assembly; 
Twenty-Seventh Session Suppl. 21(A/8721) p. 70 and International Legal 
M&terials Vol. XI (1972) p. 892. Countries signing the Declaration 
were: Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. Five 
countries: Bo£bados, El Salvador, Guyana, Jamaica and Panama participated 
in the Conference but did not sign the Declaration. 
52. See Pinto, "Problems of Developing States and their Effects 
on Decisions on Law of the Sea," in Alexander (Ed.) The Law of the 
Sea: Needs and Interests of the Developing Countries" (Kingston, R.I.: 
University of Rhode Island, 1973) pp. 5, 10-11. In~August 1971 
Pinto had told U.N. Committee on Sea Bed that bis delegation 
considered that the figure of 200 miles suggested by the representative 
of Kenya might in the circumstances prove equitable and fair." See 
U.N. Doc,A/AC.138/SC.i/SR.II of August 2, 1971. 
53. Speech reprinted in International Legal Materials Vol. XI 
(1972) pp. 656-659. 
54. U.N. Doc.A/AC.138/SC.Il/L.34 reprinted in Official Records, 
United Nations General Assembly: Twenty-Eighth Session Suppl. 21(A/902) 
Vol. Ill pp. 71-72. 
55. U.N. Doc. A/AC,138/SC.Il/L.35 reprinted in ibid p. 75. 
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specified a 200 miles (economic zone): measured from the baseline from 
which a territorial-sea of 1 2 miles is-, measured. Australia and 
Norway submitted a joint proposal supporting 200 miles economic 
zone but specifically reserving freedom of navigation within- the 
57 zone. 
Within Africa the, .concept .commanded clear support. This was 
indicated at the.."Conclusions. of :t^ ,,.CT?ne.ral. Report of the African 
States Regional Seminar on,,Law of the Sea" hold at Yaounde in June 
5 8 ' •' •re-*•' '•' ' ' 0 ; 1972. . Later on, ...Fourteen. African, .States;, ...including Kenya, submitted 
joint draft article;?, on. economic,, zpn.^  .identical to Kenya's original 
proposal. .; ' yy • :-.;vr: '•• 
;; By.; the endof',: the first'substantive session of UNCLOS III 
in August 1-.974 it was 'apparent that the majority of the "delegations 
suppQ^tedvithev/concept Of : 200 miles exclusive economic zone. It was at 
that.-point ;that the leader of the' United States delegation wrote that 
.'.!wd.th..-ja, few exceptions,. .economic' zone proposals have been' proferred by 
60 all conference groups including the United States." At the end 
of the second substantive, /session of the Conference, the Second < • O-K;- /.(orivv •. » 
Committee whose task it was to draft the articles relating to areas 
56. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 13^ /SC.i.,I.l/L.:37, reprinted in. ibid .p. 78. 
57. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.36 reprinted in ibid p. 77. 
58. Submitted to the'U.N. Cbmmit'tee oh%e6'Bed as A/AC.158/79 
reprinted in Official Records, United .fet-lons Genera!!/ Assembly: • 
Twenty-Seventh Session. Suppl. 21 (A/8721 ) p. 73. "T~! 
k. ' 
59. The other States were: Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory 
Coast, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius$Senegal, Sierra Leorie, 
Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Republic of Tanzania; • 
See UN. Doc. A"AC.138/SC.Il/L.40,reprinted in Official Records, 
United Nations General Assembly/Pwjenty-fBighth Session. Suppl. 
21 (A/9021) Vol. Ill-p. 87~. ' - " r 
60. John R. Stevenson and Benard H. Oxman, "The Third United 
Nations-Conference on the Lav/ of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas 
Session",:?4mericai^-Jou^nftl' of International Law. .Voly -69 (.1975) p. 16. 
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of national jurisdiction adopted in their Single Negotiating 
Text an Article 46 provision that "The exclusive economic zone shall 
not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which 
61 the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." Precisely, the 
same wordings were adopted in the subsequent negotiating sessions which 
62 ended in May 1976. 
It seems definite that with whatever may be its shortcomings 
and whatever might have been the reasons for various states supporting 
the concept of exclusive economic zone, it is now a principle over 
which the parties negotiating the new law of the sea have agreed. 
What remains to be ironed out are matters of details regarding the 
63 
rights and obligations of the coastal States vis a vis third parties. 
Whatever is the outcome of UNCLOS III, that is whether or not a 
treaty is finally agreed upon and signed, there is no doubt that 
exclusive economic zone will be adopted by coastal states which A 
will adopt national legislations to prescribe their own general 
principles to guide subsequent management of access, exploration, 
exploitation and conservation of resources of the exolusive economic 
zone. 
It was not clear if during the years when the concept of 200 
miles economic zone was developed Kenya delegates were motivated 
by well-defined national policy intentions. At least to date, Kenya 
64 has only claimed a 12 miles territorial sea. 
61. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Part.II 7th May 1975 also reprinted 
in International Legal Materials Vol. 14 (1975) pp. 710 721. 
62. U.N. Doc. A/CONP.62/WP.8/Rev.l/Part II, May 6, 1976. 
Article 45. 
63. See discussions by Okidi "Conservation and Development of 
Coastal and Offshore Resources in Eastern Africa: -Agenda 
for Research" (University of Nairobi, IDS/WP 268 June 1976):.. 
pp. 8-14 to appear in Journal of East African Research and Develop-
ment Vol. 6 No. 1. 
64. Discussed in Okidi, Legislative Development in Kenya's 
Coastal and Offshore Affairs: Territorial Sea and the Continental 
Shelf (University of Nairobi, IDS/WP. 285 October 1976). 
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What would seem to be the motivating factor in the Kenya 
65 
choice is found in the country's last Development. Plan. According 
to an outline in the Plan Kenya obtained an assistance from the 
Pood and Agricyltural Organisation of the United Nations in 1962, 
to study tliefishing potentials of the Indian Ocean along the coast. 
This was followed in 1966 by a special fishery commission appointed 
by the government to carry out feasibility study into' the establishment 
of a Mombasa-based fishing fleet. The commission's recommendation 
indicated the viability of such and industry and suggested that the 
first iphase would comprise the "introduction of 12 long- liners • •. J • operating 20 to'j 200 miles from Mombasa, where there would be a fishing 
• • 6 6 
base With a 1.,000 tons capacity of cold storage". The plan for develop-
ment of these fisheries includes also arrangements for sources of -• f equipmjent£j and gears. Estimates have also been outlined for investment 
in harboui* and landing facilities and cold storage. 
• i 
: ; 
.'•'-j Ail these together would form a reasonable basis for a country 
pressing fdr a 200 miles exclusive economic zone. But if this is indeed 
the case, -then the plan has not been implemented since in "recent 
investigations at the coast this writer found that Kenya fishermen go 
hardly beyond ten miles from the coast. Thus, Kenya still has 
along way jto go before it can realize the benefits of the principle 
of exclusive economic zone which it popularized at international 
negotiations on the new law of the sea. 
65. Republio of Kenya, Development Plan, 1970—1974 (Nairobi: 
Government Printers, 1969) p. 294. 
•*' i 
66. ibid i ' 
APPENDIX A 
Profile of the Continental Shelf on Eastern Arican Coast: Cape Guardafui 
Distance from Width of the Distance from Width of the 
Cape Guardafui Shelf Cape Guardafui Shelf 
At 0 distance 52 1800 10 
100 25 1900 7 
200 48 2000 37 
300 300 16 2100 12 
400 12 40° E is @ 2130 
500 20 2200 2 
600 25 2300 18 
700 16 2400 (Pemba) 4 either side 800 o 20 2500 10 5 N is at 840 km 2600 (Zanzibar) 65 incl. island 900 19 2700 40 
1000 20 2750 (Mafia) 70 
1100 10 1800 100 
1200 10 2900 33 1300 o 8 3000 12 
45 E is at1350 3100 3 1400 4 3200 2 
1 500 4 3300 20 
(Data are estimates by Dr. K.O. Emery of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution measured 
from a tjathmetric map at the institution at the request of this author. The profile is.measured 
for every 100 km interval from Cape Guardafui to the mouth of River Ruvume. One km = 5/8 
mile. Measurement taken for continental shelf up to 200 meters isobath.) 
